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Abstract: Sub-Saharan Africa is generally one of the most electricity deprived regions in the 
world. Since the 1990s, the World Bank and other relevant and respected multilateral 
organisations have consistently advocated that the required finance to develop sub-Saharan 
Africa’s essential electricity capacity should be sourced from the private sector. However, 
despite this ongoing advocacy, the private sector has been unenthusiastic to answer this call. 
Much of the literature attributes this reticence to a lack of ‘good governance’: principally 
negative behaviours such as corruption. Instead, in this paper we argue that this is too simplistic 
an explanation, as private investment has still been able to thrive in other locations where such 
negative behaviours have existed. To support this argument, we utilise an interdisciplinary 
approach to review three separate academic governance perspectives, to deliver a more 
comprehensive view. These are: 1) Financial Investment Governance, the private sector 
investor’s perspective, which focuses on the rules and institutions (or lack of) that directly 
influence the financial investment environment; 2) Political Governance, the political economy 
perspective, which relate to the negative, indirect investment consequences resulting from the 
way that governments govern; and 3) Technological Governance, a ‘systems’ perspective, 
which encompasses how the standard structure and organisation of the wider electricity 
delivery system in each country, negatively impacts such investment. In discussion and 
conclusion, we find that if the development policy perspective for delivering electricity access 
to the region is to be successfully constructed around private investment, as the multilateral 
development community advocates, it will need to accommodate 15 distinct issues that can be 
identified from this comprehensive approach to governance. 
Keywords: Electricity supply; electricity infrastructure; electricity access; financial risk; 
governance; sub-Saharan Africa   
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Rethinking the governance of energy poverty in sub-Saharan Africa: 
Reviewing three academic perspectives on electricity infrastructure investment   
1. Introduction  
This paper revisits how governance is used to explain why the private sector has been 
unenthusiastic towards investing in Sub-Sahara African (SSA) electricity infrastructure, by 
applying a multidimensional application of governance, which uses interdisciplinary 
perspectives. We do recognise that there has been a recent growth in private sector investment 
interest, through independent power producers (IPPs) [1] in the region. But this has been from 
a very low base and has a bias towards South Africa and partially Kenya, which are regional 
statistical outliers.  
Electricity capacity growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa, not including South Africa (SA), 
over the last 40 years have been half those found in other developing regions [2]. Holstenkamp 
[3] writes that 95% of the population without access to modern forms of energy live in 
developing Asian and African countries, and that ‘the challenge is considerable, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa.’  Historically, Official Development Assistance (ODA) was used to 
finance electricity capacity growth in SSA, but ODA was never able to deliver the level of 
resource that was required to satisfy the scope of this investment need. Towards the end of the 
last millennium, expectations shifted under the Wolfensohn’s presidency of the World Bank, 
so that it was now deemed that such financing should instead come from private sector sources 
[4-5]. Since then, both senior personnel and policy papers from the World Bank and other 
respected multilateral organisations, have repeated this call for the private sector to finance 
SSA electricity capacity growth [6-13]. However, despite these constant calls for support, the 
private sector continues to show a dearth of enthusiasm for investing in SSA electricity 
infrastructure development projects – ignoring the current generationally low global interest 
rate levels and a recognisable desire from the international financial markets for investment 
opportunities surrounding infrastructure.   
This private investor reluctance is recognisable by the lack of SSA sourced ‘Clean 
Development Mechanism’ (CDM) projects that have been registered, whilst conceding the 
technology restrictions of this measure – the CDM was defined in 2007 and is a market-based 
mechanism designed to elicit private sector participation: yet by the end of 2014, the SSA 
region represented only 0.63% of the total of CDM projects globally [14]: despite the financial 
markets – consisting of pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign-wealth funds, mutual 
funds, (to name the major constituents) – having more than 100 trillion $US in assets under 
management to invest [15-16]. With this level of resource, and the clear investment need for 
such infrastructure to be developed within SSA – a lack of enthusiasm could still be argued to 
be a generous description of the private sector’s willingness to invest. 
Governance – a term that encompasses factors such as accountancy and institutional 
capacity, political stability and bureaucratic flexibility – can play a vital role in shaping the 
direction and scope of private sector investment [17].  Yadav et al. [18] even go so far as to 
write that a transformation of ‘governance models are required to meet the needs of 
communities living in rural and remote areas and particularly for those subject to energy and 
economic poverty.’ Yet many approaches to ‘governance’ oversimplify the extent of the 
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challenges and tend to ignore the polycentric or systems level complexity that cuts across the 
actors, networks, and knowledge structures needed to address poverty [19]. 
Traditionally, when the literature utilises ‘governance’ to explain why the private sector is 
unenthusiastic for investing in the region’s electricity infrastructure, it often applies a narrow 
interpretation that centres on negative behaviours such as corruption. As private investment 
has still been able to thrive in other locations where such negative behaviours have existed [20], 
we challenge this view and argue that the literature is too narrow in its governance focus. As a 
decision to invest is a function of risk and reward [21-23], we instead contend that the lack of 
investment interest is a result of a financing ‘market failure’ related to excessive ‘negative 
uncertainties’ or risks1: and these risks derive from the indirect unintended consequences of 
the governance process, rather than the governance process itself. To do this, we utilise three 
separate academic perspectives to build a holistic picture of how the current governance 
application surrounding the development of electricity infrastructure contributes to risk. In this 
paper we call these three perspectives: 
• Financial Investment Governance: the private sector investor’s perspective, that 
focuses on the rules and institutions (or lack of) that directly influence the 
investment environment in SSA; 
• Political Governance: the political economy perspective, that focuses on the 
indirect investment consequences resulting from the way that SSA governments 
govern. 
• Technological Governance:  a ‘systems’ perspective, which encompasses how the 
standard type of structure and organisation of the greater electricity delivery regime 
in SSA, negatively impacts such investment.  
Before scrutinising each of these perspectives: first we define what is meant by ‘good 
governance’ in this paper, as there is no common definition of the term and it is often 
ideologically charged [24]; we then explain what is meant by private investment; we clarify 
why investors invest; we summarise the standard characteristics of this type of infrastructure 
investment; and we explain how negative uncertainty deters investment.  
To define our three academic perspectives, an extensive interdisciplinary literature review 
was conducted, principally integrating theories from across four separate academic disciplines: 
investment finance, project management, development studies, and innovation studies. The 
investment finance literature contributed to dimensions such as why investors invest, why 
excessive negative uncertainty deters investment, and outlines the parameters of investment 
governance. The project management literature furnished its theories on risk, as most electricity 
infrastructures are developed through projects and risk forms a major part of that discipline’s 
theory. The development studies literature supplied its theories on political economy and data 
for the three perspectives. The innovation literature offered its theories on systems and regimes; 
                                                 
 
1 In this paper, both terms refer to the factors that cannot be pre-determined and can negatively impact an 
investments performance. It is accepted there is a degree of ambiguity and subjectivity surrounding the exact 
meaning of both these terms – within the financial markets (as this is a paper concerning private investment) and 
within the project management academic literature, the term ‘risk’ is usually regarded as being interchangeable 
with ‘negative uncertainty’[21,25,26]. 
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and the ‘diffusion of technology’, as electricity infrastructure development is essentially a 
diffusion of technology. 
2. Conceptual Approach and Key Terms 
Here, we introduce readers to three core concepts or terms used throughout the article: ‘good 
governance,’ ‘private investment,’ and ‘risk.’ 
2.1 Grappling with good governance 
Governance broadly refers to any of the multitudinous processes or institutions in place by 
which people set and enable rules needed to reach desired outcomes [27]. While most 
commonly envisioned as the domain of governments, many other actors are involved in 
governance, including civil society organizations, corporations, and institutions of finance. 
Governance, when it concerns SSA, is often applied narrowly, negatively and ideologically as 
a description of an act of financial misappropriation [20, 24], through a ‘principal-agency’ 
framework [28]. Such misappropriation is possible through the abuse of a power asymmetry, 
often held by individuals on behalf of the structure of state: this imbalance is then used to obtain 
a non-state obligatory financial gain [29]. Although this is a legitimate perspective of 
governance in our context, it represents only a small part of the theoretical lens that shapes the 
governance matrix that we use in this paper. Instead, we apply the term governance less rigidly 
and ideologically, using a much wider definition and utilising different stakeholder 
perspectives.  
Firstly, our definition of governance will apply a systemic approach: encompassing 
interactions and decision-making among all the various relevant stakeholders, reflecting the 
gradients of power and influence, involved in a collective problem – that being in this paper, 
the development and operation of electricity infrastructure within SSA. These interactions then 
lead to the creation or reinforcement of rules and social norms, along with accompanying 
institutions [24]. Secondly, governance efficiency and sustainability (good or bad) is 
determined by its ability to deliver acceptable outcomes for all the relevant stakeholders, by 
successfully aligning stakeholder interests [30].  
We argue, that the principal reason there is so much ambiguity in establishing what ‘good 
governance’ entails and the reason for the apparent obstinacy in achieving it in a SSA context, 
is due to its effectiveness being normally defined from the perspective of the stakeholder that 
is applying it: in other words, it is normative in its application [24]. This dichotomy is quite 
easy to observe in our field of study, by the apparent conflict of application between the 
interests of SSA national governments and those of the external financial donor countries: over 
accusations of corruption.   
As successful electricity infrastructure development is supposedly the desired outcome for 
all stakeholders, all sponsors apparently want the successful delivery of affordable and reliable 
electricity, good governance should not in fact be the issue at all. The reason that it is we argue, 
is because the negative impact of the unintended consequences of governance outcomes, are 
not equally appreciated by all stakeholders and the benefits of such development are being 
contestably apportioned. Good governance is in fact a ‘collective action’ problem [20]: 
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achieving it requires a holistic understanding of what it should entail for all relevant 
stakeholders, and agreement about its fairness by all sponsors in its application. Good 
governance, therefore, requires a belief in its legitimacy [31]. 
2.2 Conceptualizing private investment and how it is impacted by risk 
In most of sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), the domestic banking system is not 
able to privately finance any significant capacity increases in electricity infrastructure; 
compounded by there being few: significant corporate, non-government institutional, or 
‘private office’ investors [16, 32, 33]. So, in the context of this paper, private sector investment 
will refer to internationally sourced (out of region) private investment.  
Applying Occam’s razor: an investment can be defined “as the act of incurring an 
immediate cost (the value of the investment) in the expectation of future rewards (the 
investment return).” [22]. This definition suggests: that there are two related, but separate 
elements involved in an investment; and that investors require certainty of outcomes from the 
second element, in response to the first.  
A decision to proceed with an investment, is also a relative decision, as any individual 
investment opportunity does not exist in isolation, as there are always many alternative 
investments that exist [21-23]. This means that there exists an opportunity cost when investing 
in electricity capacity in SSA, as the financial resources of that investment can no longer be 
utilised elsewhere. Investors will therefore discount the perceived future rewards of an 
investment, in response to any risks that can impact those rewards. 
Further, an investment in the development of new electricity infrastructure in SSA will be 
illiquid – meaning that such an investment cannot be easily removed, sold, or exchanged for 
cash, without a potential significant loss of value [34]. In any sort of electricity infrastructure 
development in SSA, the investment’s value will be tied to the location that the asset has been 
constructed within (the asset cannot simply just be removed and taken away intact) [29]. The 
only way therefore for the investment to realise its value as an investment, is for it perform as 
it was intended when the investment was planned.  Additionally, infrastructure investments of 
this type will be long dated, usually more than 20 years; and if their tariffs are correctly set and 
regulated, such infrastructure will also represent a ‘normal’ margin business 2 , without 
excessive profitability [35]. 
2.3 Consequences of risk through ‘optionality’, ‘cost’ and ‘reward’ 
So, when taking an investment’s: relativeness, illiquidity, normal margins, and long dated 
timeframes into account – a private investor’s willingness to proceed with an investment 
opportunity, will be determined by the perceived level of ‘negative uncertainty’ or risk that 
                                                 
 
2 Normal Margin is determined by a ‘benchmark’ interest rate such as LIBOR, plus a weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC). WACC is a calculation of a firm's cost of capital in which each category of capital is 
proportionately weighted, to represent its relative risk to its alternative uses and its absolute risk profile [36]. 
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surrounds the ongoing value of their immediate cost of entering that investment and the 
likelihood of attaining the expected future rewards [21-23, 34].  
Risk impacts a decision to progress with an illiquid investment in three ways: it firstly 
delays a decision to proceed, by amplifying the value in deferral (a type of optionality); 
secondly it forces an investor to discount the future rewards for participation, which both 
reduces the desire to proceed and makes alternative investment opportunities relatively more 
attractive; and thirdly, it discourages opportunity evaluation by professional investment 
managers. 
In SSA, from the private investor’s point of view, there is no urgency to invest – as there 
are many more electricity projects needing investors, than investors needing electricity 
projects. If we treat the ability to delay an investment, as being ‘like having the right to choose 
when to invest at some point in the future’ – we can place a value on that right to delay, by 
treating it as a synthetic option which has a value3 [22]. This ‘optionality’ value will then cease 
to exist, once an investment proceeds – just as a normal option ceases to have value once it is 
exercised. Therefore, proceeding with an investment, destroys the synthetic options value. 
Further, the more risk that surrounds an investment, the greater the value that can be implied 
to the right to delay the commencement of an investment [22, 37]. 
Investment is a relative decision, as any individual investment opportunity does not exist 
in isolation. Investors will therefore discount the perceived ‘future rewards’ of an investment 
in SSA, in response to excessive negative uncertainty (in SSA, often to zero), against any 
alternative opportunities that are not so burdened. This makes the investment a less/un-
attractive proposition, and in response to this: investors will either demand a higher return, 
undermining the project’s commerciality and attractiveness as an investment; or they will just 
invest elsewhere, probably in an unrelated location [22, 34]. 
We also need to appreciate how excessive negative uncertainty impacts the evaluation 
methods of the actual private sector investment management teams. In the competitive, highly 
paid ‘job market’ that is the finance industry – an investment manager can expect to lose their 
job if they make flawed investment decisions, particularly ones outside customary investment 
parameters which are illiquid [34] – they move away from the heard. Equally there is also an 
expectation of quality productivity, they are not expected to forever evaluate investment 
                                                 
 
3 A financial option is a form of ‘financial derivative’: 
• It is a standardised contract, which is derived from the existence of an ‘underlying financial instrument’: 
such as an equity, bond, or currency. 
• It grants the owner of the option, either a right (but not an obligation) to buy or sell the underlying 
financial instrument before and/or at a ‘point in the future’, for an agreed price and terms.  
• This delayed right to buy or sell has a value, which can be calculated using a formula (commonly using 
an algorithm, known as Black and Scholes3).  
The option ceases to have value, either after it is exercised or when it expires (the ‘point in the future’, is past). 
The options value both increases and decreases, with the level of risk over the price of the underlying financial 
instrument (volatility, in options language).  
A ‘synthetic’ option is a situation that presents the same characteristics and opportunities as those offered by a 
physical option: and can be valued as such) [37]. 
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opportunities, without proceeding with some of them. For ongoing employment and 
productivity reasons therefore, investment managers prefer to evaluate opportunities with more 
certainty of outcomes, not less. Finally, it should be noted that the investment attractiveness of 
normal margin businesses with very high up-front costs, such as electricity infrastructure, are 
particularly sensitive to risks. 
With these basic terms (which we will continually refer back to) laid out, the next three sections 
of the paper spell-out the three very different perspectives on electricity governance in SSA. 
3. Financial Investment Governance    
This governance perspective encompasses the rules and institutions (or lack of) which directly 
influence the investment environment in SSA. It is observable, by applying Dixit and Pindyck’s 
definition of investment (sec 2.2) to governance, that there is a period of uncertainty between 
the initial cost and the future rewards. To reduce risk therefore, ‘good’ investment governance 
will entail factors that protect the ‘immediate cost’ of an investment and then enable the 
delivery of the ‘future rewards’ proficiently and with certainty, consistent with the expectations 
of the investment when it was planned; and bad investment governance concern factors that 
destroy or remove value from both the ‘immediate cost’ and the ‘future rewards’ of the 
investment. These will now be characterised as the ability to appropriate. 
With SSA electricity infrastructure development, there are several observable structural 
governance factors that are perceived as being common in SSA by private investors, that can 
prevent the ability to appropriate, producing a compromised investment environment: these are 
now categorized below.  
3.1 Uncertain property rights 
Central to understanding how uncertainty impacts an investment in new electricity 
infrastructure in SSA, is the concept of investment’s physical illiquidity discussed earlier (sec 
2.2). With standard electricity infrastructure development in SSA, the investment’s value will 
be tied to the location that the development has been constructed within. The certainty of 
ongoing ownership of the asset and its revenues is therefore crucial. Any negative uncertainty 
surrounding the support of property rights, is therefore a fundamental structural governance 
issue that destabilises investment [38].  
The governments of SSA take significant pride in their national sovereignty of their 
territories and the assets that reside within them; but as this pride is often realised by the 
usurping of property rights when it is deemed expedient, this creates unintended negative 
uncertainty, reducing the attractiveness for foreign private investment. The past behaviour of 
the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, particularly over the ownership of land, represents a good 
example of such outcomes [39]; also, it should be noted that there are currently policy 
discussions whether similar activities should be repeated in South Africa. 
3.2 Excessive planning costs due to a lack of standardisation.  
In much of SSA, there is no standardisation of the tender process and/or paperwork for a 
privately financed electricity infrastructure project’, particularly for unsolicited bids [40]. 
Rethinking the governance of energy poverty 
 
 
 8 
 
 
Because of this governance issue, “it takes projects in Africa on average seven years to advance 
through the project development cycle” [40] and the planning costs can be as high as 10% of 
the project value, in contrast to the OECD standard of under 1% [41]. For example, in Kenya, 
a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) was 1000 pages long, where an equivalent Indian off-take 
agreement for electricity would be expected to be only 20 pages [4]. 
It is challenging for an under resourced government that is already struggling to deliver all 
the services that are expected of it, to further facilitate such a specialist capability, but their 
failure to do so has unintended consequences. The costly commitment that is entailed in 
producing a comprehensive tender represents a significant ‘sunken cost’ for the sponsor, which 
is difficult to justify when there is no certainty of reimbursement. This risk discourages 
investment interest from ever arising, particularly as tariff regulated electricity infrastructure is 
a relatively low margin business with very high up-front costs on top of this planning cost [42]. 
The higher the fixed set up costs are as a percentage of the total value of the project, the greater 
the negative impact on investor interest as a response to this uncertainty [21,22]. It is to mitigate 
this issue that South Africa has created its IPP Office4 (some argue, with great success) and the 
IFC has instigated its ‘Scaling Solar’ program5 [32]. 
3.3  Reallocation of project ownership/control. 
Past unexpected reallocation of larger scale infrastructure projects to an unrelated party, usually 
between the planning and construction phases, have also created huge indecision amongst 
investors as it creates the perception of policy uncertainty [43]. This transfer again results in 
an instant loss of value of the discussed preparation costs up to that point, discussed in (3.2), 
by an investor. This is slightly different risk to uncertain property rights, discussed in (3.1), as 
reallocation of projects usually occurs because of excessive delays in the commencement of a 
projects construction – but as excessive delays are ‘par of the course’ in SSA, due to the many 
challenges that surround projects in the region, this is questionable in its legitimacy. Examples 
of such reallocations are: The Grand Inga dam project in the DRC and The MphandaNkuwa 
dam project in Mozambique. 
3.4 Equity dilution, ownership restrictions, and ‘local content’ procurement. 
Conventions, both explicit and implicit, that convey a percentage of domestic (African) 
ownership are widespread for ‘greenfield’ infrastructure projects throughout SSA: where an 
extraterritorial privately owned project is expected/required to allocate a significant percentage 
of its ownership (equity) in that project to domestic interests (such policies are not unique to 
SSA). South Africa has its Black Empowerment legislation6 and Mozambique has local equity 
                                                 
 
4 https://www.ipp-projects.co.za/ 
5 https://www.scalingsolar.org/ 
6 https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp 
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ownership rules concerning Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)7 of 5-20% of the equity in the 
project8, as examples; but these arrangements often can be less transparent9. This can be a very 
constructive feature of governance, when done in ways that deliver value to a project, as it 
helps to allocate value to domestic interest and align both domestic and foreign stakeholder 
interests (which forms part of our ‘good governance’ objectives – sec 2.1) – but equally 
destructive, when it removes value. 
The introduction of new stakeholders at the equity level, “even from the development stage 
of a project, {potentially} introduces cleavages between partners. As a project expands 
to include more participants, it becomes more difficult to allocate the project’s potential 
value in a way that all stakeholders see as fair. Greed generates an imbalance in the 
distribution of the project’s costs and rewards—an imbalance that grows with the scale 
of the project, generating seeds of resentment along the way. The award winning 
construction project analyst Edward W. Merrow, claims that the inability to allocate 
costs and benefits fairly dooms most {projects} before they ever get started. However, 
even when the projects do proceed, those who believe they have been treated unfairly 
never let go of their opposition. Instead they generate what he describes as project 
“turbulence” that often overwhelms even the most well- intended project management” 
[33:45]. 
 
Lastly, in South Africa there are also local content rules that dictate a necessary level of local 
procurement to be included in a project, even if this is sub-standard to or more expensive than 
alternative overseas sourced materials10. In other SSA countries, as there is no applicable 
industry to support, this is a less pertinent issue except for how it can impact employment: the 
employment of local unsuitable staff may be encouraged over better qualified expatriate 
alternatives.  
The worthy intention of all three practices is to enhance domestic ownership of important 
assets and/or increase domestic participation in the recipient country’s economy; the 
unintended consequence of such directives is to create risk through the transfer of value, which 
then impedes the investor’s ability to appropriate. 
3.5 Exchange rate convertibility 
This dimension from the financial governance perspective concerns the inability to repatriate 
the initial cost and the rewards of an investment, into the original currency of the investor [33]. 
                                                 
 
7 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs): This is the standard type of investment vehicle that is utilised by SSA 
governments, to attract private sector investment for infrastructure development. The World Bank PPPIRC 
defines it as: “A long term contract between a private party and a government entity, for providing a public asset 
or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility, and the remuneration 
is linked to performance.” (ppp.worldbank.org) 
8 Legislation: Law 115/2011, August 10 – Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), Business Concessions (BC) and 
Mega-Projects Law (MPL). 
9https://www.transparency.org/  
10 https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Revised-Preferential-Procurement-Regulations-2017?Id=2575 
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In SSA, all currencies are termed ‘soft’ (excluding SA), meaning they are illiquid and not easily 
exchangeable in large value transactions. As discussed earlier, electricity infrastructure 
investment needs to be sourced from overseas (sec 2.2), but the investment’s revenues are 
domestically produced: this creates a significant inability to repatriate the immediate cost of an 
investment back into the original currency of the overseas investor [33]. This becomes a 
governance issue, when the illiquidity is compounded by exchange controls, which prevents 
any repatriation of money from the country. For example, Mozambique introduced such 
restrictions in 2016, where unless the funds have been earned through export (domestically 
sold electricity doesn’t qualify), they cannot be repatriated from the country [44 11]. The 
inability to repatriate funds by an investor is the ultimate barrier to appropriation and is an 
investment killer: as this removes both the ‘future rewards’ of an investment as well as 
destroying the ‘initial value’. This risk is a factor that is often missed by the academic 
development literature [16]. 
3.6 Monopoly control of electricity supply 
As the availability and affordability of electricity supply is widely regarded as a public good 
[45], it is standard practice throughout SSA for the electricity utilities to be government owned 
and protected, with monopoly rights over grid supplied electricity [35, 40]. This reality 
however requires that investors accept that their customer for any electricity commercially 
generated, will likely be a recipient country’s utility – but these utilities do not have an 
investment grade credit rating, preventing them from being considered a credit worthy 
counterparty from the perspective of an investor [1, 2, 35, 40, 46]. The unintended consequence 
of such monopoly control is again a disruption to investment: barely solvent monopoly utilities 
represent a significant investment risk.  
A standard way around this, is for the actual government to offer guarantees: for example, 
Kenya has partially done so with the Lake Turkana wind farm project, through 
guaranteeing/underwriting connectivity of the project to the country’s electricity grid 12 ; 
Tanzania has granted sovereign guarantees to the Songas project. However, SSA governments 
are often reluctant to give such guarantees (see sec 5.3) [46, 47], and when they do, they can 
refute their obligations giving rise to a ‘credit rating’ issues as well, as also happened in 
Tanzania surrounding the Independent Power Tanzania Limited: 
“The dispute relates to Claimant’s alleged investment in Tanzania, by way of a loan 
acquired by its subsidiary, Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited (“SCB HK”), 
made to Independent Power Tanzania Limited (“IPTL”) in order to finance a Power Plant 
in Tanzania located in Tegeta, approximately 25 kilometres north of Dar es Salaam”13.  
                                                 
 
11 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-05/mozambique-sets-foreign-exchange-limits-standard-
bank-says 
12 Aldwych International – the developer 
13 Case between Independent Power Tanzania ltd (ITPL) and Standard Chartered Bank 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1184.pdf 
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3.7 Uncommercial tariffs  
Commercially unrealistic tariff regulation, which restricts the ability of an investor from 
capturing enough value to deliver a minimum suitable level of ‘future rewards’ from 
participation, is very common in SSA. The usual argument cited for the uncommercial, low 
levels of tariff: is that it protects poor consumers against unaffordable and expensive electricity. 
The reality however is that low-income households are excluded from the electricity supply 
and will continue to be so if private investment doesn’t increase; instead it is the successful 
political lobbying from wealthier consumers, particularly from business, that keep electricity 
prices low [2, 40].   
Throughout SSA it is not unusual for tariff rates to be below the actual cost of generation. 
So, when you consider there are also substantial losses of electricity in the transmission 
process, for example 25% in Tanzania [45]; and a significant failure of customers paying their 
bills [1,2, 45, 48], this is a major risk for investment. It should be noted, that the recent 
electricity generation cost reductions through renewable technologies, could be starting to 
improve this issue: in 2016, Zambia completed a solar tender at (US) 6.02c/kWh the cheapest 
renewable tariff to that date in the region [32]. However, this creates a new kind of risk, which 
will be discussed in the Technology Governance section (sec 5, comments about Nigeria and 
tariff expectations). 
3.8 Uncertain protective ‘Law and Order’ 
This final financial concerns both impacts on the physical infrastructure and the key staff 
that are relied upon for the efficient operation of an investment asset.  
Infrastructure can be damaged through acts of terrorism, vandalism or criminality; and key 
staff (especially expatriate), are increasingly under threat of unreasonable harassment by police 
and other ‘officials’, and in extreme circumstances kidnapping for ransom [49]. In 
Mozambique for example: RENAMO (the current political opposition and former military foe 
during the country’s civil war) have recently threatened to again resort to armed conflict14; or 
the local police often supplement their unreliable incomes with harassment of foreign 
identifiable personal.  
In both Kenya and Zimbabwe (amongst others), significant political tensions exist between 
the government and opposition, which have manifested recently in major public disorder; 
where in Kenya transmission infrastructure is continually vandalised or has electricity is stolen 
from it, by marginalised populations; and key personnel are subject to kidnapping [16, 50]. In 
South Africa, as a legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle, vandalism of electricity infrastructure 
is seen as a legitimate form of protest by the politically frustrated that are upset about 
continuing poor access to electricity; and large scale, organised theft of infrastructure is a 
common occurrence, particularly within the Gauteng municipality area [51, 52]. 
                                                 
 
14 https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/negotiations-between-frelimo-renamo-suspended-mozambique-war-escalates-
1573691 
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The unintended consequences of this is to make it difficult to operate an investment 
efficiently: as the assets maintenance costs will be very high, and it is difficult to recruit and 
preserve the skilled staff that are required to manage or maintain the asset [42]. This then 
requires levels of compensation or contingencies, which weakens appropriation.  
4. Political Governance   
This governance perspective concerns the indirect investment consequences resulting from the 
way that SSA governments govern. Statements delivered in an official capacity by various SSA 
government representatives at a recent African energy conference in South Africa15, suggests 
that their governments understand that having access to the necessary finance to construct 
electricity infrastructure, is central to their ability to deliver an affordable and reliable 
electricity service to their populations. And further, those governments appear to accept that 
the only realistic source for this finance, is through the successful engagement of international 
private investors.  
Yet despite this declared recognition, we argue that there is still an ongoing disconnect 
about what is required to deliver this investment from a governance perspective, due to a failure 
of each government’s own narratives to appreciate the indirect consequences of how they 
govern. This is perhaps because the relevant ‘political actors’ are too focussed on their own 
direct political needs, rather than appreciating how their governance activities undermine the 
wider investment environment.  
To help appreciate this incongruity, it is possible to un-pack political governance failure into 
three causal components:  
1) A power asymmetry – there is a power imbalance between the insiders (the political class) 
of the recipient country and the outsiders (the investors) without a reliable avenue of recourse 
if/when this asymmetry is abused [20, 29];  
2) Neo-patrimonialism – the governing elite’s need to finance a political patronage system, 
to maintain control of the political structure that delivers benefits to those that administer it 
[53, 54];  
3) Policy confusion – uncertain and repeatedly changing policy priorities, driven by the 
contradictions of fulfilling the different needs of four separate constituencies: the political 
leadership, the leadership’s principal supporters, the larger electorate (usually driven by an 
election) and multilateral stakeholders (such as aid donors or development banks). The 
resulting policy fluidity is then incompatible with the long-time horizons that the standard 
method of financing such infrastructure requires: known as Project Financing (see 4.2).  
From these three components, we can then extract two classes of investment risks: those that 
arise from financial misappropriation; and those that arise from government policy fluidity. 
                                                 
 
15 The 2018, Africa Energy Indaba – February, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
Rethinking the governance of energy poverty 
 
 
 13 
 
 
4.1 The risk of misappropriation  
Financial misappropriation through informal ‘rent-seeking’ [55] that is facilitated by an abuse 
of asymmetric power, is the standard interpretation of governance failure that is applied to SSA 
[20, 29]; and a regular explanation advanced for the lack of foreign investment in the region [4, 46, 48, 56]. Whilst accepting such misappropriation is a burden on investment, we however 
advocate in this paper that this is an oversimplification of the challenge, which then obstructs 
our ability to create a robust enough governance structure to permit overseas investment. Many 
forms of ‘rent-seeking’ have been apparent in the recent and rapid economic transformations 
in China, India, Brazil, and South East Asia, yet these regions have still enjoyed rapid and 
constructive economic growth [20] – so financial misappropriation cannot be a definitive 
explanation for a reluctance to invest on its own. Instead we argue: it is excessive and uncertain 
‘rent-seeking’ that destabilises the investment landscape. If the value of any required 
appropriation is foreseeable and is not excessive, an investment can still proceed and be 
successful; and such appropriation could even be legitimately formalised, as has occurred in 
Australia with their various government sponsored ‘resource rent taxes’16. 
An electricity utility that has effectively regulated tariffs, is a ‘normal margin ‘business 
model, as the tariff regulation limits the ability to charge a ‘rent’ creating value (in fact, as 
discussed in sect. 3.7, it is usually difficult to even achieve a normal and reasonable investment 
return from the ownership of electricity infrastructure in SSA). This prevents the existence 
‘economic rents’ as described by Anne Krueger [55] from existing, unlike ‘say’ the large ‘rents’ 
that are available from within the resource extraction industries. In SSA, there is strong 
evidence that ‘rent-seeking’ can often become disconnected from the existence of rents, as the 
expectations and pressures of the neo-patrimonialism system encourage rent-seeking behaviour 
from its ‘political agents’, regardless of whether rents exist to be captured. Further, 
“privatisation and liberalisation might reduce rents, but increase rent-seeking behaviour or 
endeavour to acquire rents” – as it both introduces commercial transparency, efficiency, and 
competition; whilst also creating more layers of bureaucracy and therefore possible ‘rent-
seekers’ [54:27]. This means that the electricity infrastructure business model is not sufficiently 
robust when faced with any sizable uncertainty regarding misappropriation, as it is vulnerable 
to becoming un-commercial when consistent illicit demands are placed upon it. As foreign 
investment in SSA is normally associated with the high ‘rent’ carrying business models 
associated with resource extraction, it is unclear how comprehensively SSA ‘policy actors’ 
appreciate this financing vulnerability (or care) that is applicable to electricity infrastructure 
projects [16]. 
4.2 Policy fluidity risk 
Policy fluidity encompasses the issues of regulation and policy inconsistency, which disrupt 
the embedded factors which are necessary for the financing process, during an asset’s 
development and operation. These can impact either infrastructure cost inputs, caused by (but 
                                                 
 
16 https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Petroleum-resource-rent-tax/; 
http://www.minerals.org.au/file_upload/files/reports/Deloitte_WA_Iron_Ore_Royalty_Analysis_7_Nov_2016.p
df 
Rethinking the governance of energy poverty 
 
 
 14 
 
 
not limited to) issues such as technology application or procurement directives, creating 
investment risk; or infrastructure revenue outputs, caused by (but not limited to) such matters 
as controlled tariffs or taxes, which dilute investment return certainties. The reason government 
consistency is important, is due to the mechanics of the standard approach to financing 
electricity infrastructure that the private sector can use in SSA, which the finance industry 
labels ‘Project Financing17’.  Any behaviour by government that cannot be predicted for the 
life of this financing process, normally 20 + years, discourages potential investors [43]. 
Governments are inconsistent in their policy, due to a continually changing order of 
priorities that are dictated by the conflicted agendas of the four different constituencies listed 
in this section’s introduction under ‘Policy Confusion’: which frequently change depending on 
the expedient needs of government. This type of uncertainty has been developed even further, 
by Erdmann & Engel [54], to include an additional structural component that they have added 
to their neo-patrimonialism governance theory. 
“Neo-patrimonialism is a mix of two types of domination. Elements of {both} patrimonial 
and legal-rational bureaucratic domination18, {that then} penetrate each other.” “The 
distinction between private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and 
public reference can be made to this distinction – it is a different matter whether this is 
observed or not.” [54:18]  
Policy risk arises, as it is unclear whether rules will be followed or ignored – and ironically, 
the increase in transparency and modernisation of bureaucracies can increase this confusion. 
These policy inconsistencies just described, can often be initiated by the unintended 
consequences of an attempt to implement ‘best practice’ policy by African governments –
attempts to behave in a manner expected by multilateral stakeholders such as the World Bank, 
despite the internal needs of the incumbent political system; or by attempts to implement the 
unsuitable advice of ‘outside experts’, within a context of a ‘capability’ and knowledge 
deficient skillset.  
For example, this occurred with the advent CDM, where African governments were led to 
believe that their countries would be huge beneficiaries of the CDM, resulting with many 
making significant reorganisations internally to support it – yet when the CDM commenced, it 
in fact had little impact [14, 57].  
It is possible that a policy misdirection is about to occur again, surrounding nuclear energy: 
companies associated with the Russian nuclear industry, are encouraging African governments 
to adopt nuclear energy in their electricity policy mix (as witnessed at a recent African energy 
conference 19 ). This is likely to have a substantial negative spill-over effects on wider 
                                                 
 
17  Project financing – a project’s cash flows (‘future rewards’) are pre-determined and then protected or 
guaranteed in some way, which allows it to be attributed a value. Finance is then secured and advanced, against 
this projected value. The longer the guaranteed time period, the greater is the value that is available to act as 
‘surety’. Such a process requires both the reliability and protection of the required cash flows, which demands 
both cost and revenue certainties to exist [58]. 
18 A pillar of Max Webers tripartite classification of authority – whereby decisions are reached through a 
process of: legal rationality, legal legitimacy, and bureaucracy. 
19 The 2018, Africa Energy Indaba – February, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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investment if pursued, because of an alternative highly negative narrative held by unrelated 
potential investors on the subject – nuclear energy introduces a new set of risks, related to 
safety, long-term commerciality, and issues of disposing of spent fuel. 
5. Technological Governance  
Technological Governance is a ‘systems’ perspective that concerns governance issues that arise 
from the wider system of organisation and application of current electricity provision 
technologies: which in this paper we refer to as the ‘electricity delivery regime’. This 
governance perspective is not about using a specific systems theory; we are instead using the 
term systems as means of defining our spatial and temporal limitations of study: what is in and 
out and which actors (stakeholders) to include. The predominant type of electricity system 
utilised in SSA, is a top down network ‘hub & spoke’ system [35], which is also the standard 
OECD model/regime for delivering electricity. This type of model, is government controlled 
and surrounds the utilisation of a series of large-scale electricity generating assets, with 
supporting transmission and distribution structures. However, this is also a ‘path dependent’ 
model [59, 60], that is both expensive to build and operate. 
As a proven electricity delivery model, it has served OECD countries well. But in the SSA 
context, where significantly more than half of the region’s population lives in rural areas and 
derive their livelihoods from subsistence agriculture, it is an unsuitable structure for attracting 
private investment support. This is because in SSA, the model is constrained by three systemic 
impediments: 
 1) The inability of the majority of African households to afford both the cost of electricity 
connectivity, particularly in rural areas; and then to use the electricity, once it is available – 
undermining the commercial proposition;  
2) A failure by the centralised monopoly utilities, to manage and operate such a model 
efficiently and successfully in the region – making the utility an unattractive investment 
partner;  
3) A shortfall in the required political capital and support from the relevant political actors 
– to ensure that this electricity delivery regime can maximise its potential efficiency and 
revenues.  
These hurdles do not necessarily mean that alternative models of electricity delivery cannot 
prosper, but it does mean that whilst these factors persist, this kind of electricity delivery regime 
will remain unattractive. 
As if these three impediments were not enough for potential private investors to contend 
with, a destructive ‘perfect storm’ has recently arrived. These three traditional challenges are 
now being compounded by a fourth: the global transition in what type of electricity service 
technology is best to use – the traditional one, utilising fossil fuels; or the challenger, that 
utilises distributive renewable technologies [61, 62]. From the investment perspective of a 
private investor, fossil fuel technologies are likely to become uncompetitive and redundant, a 
‘stranded asset’ problem [63]; but the replacement distributive renewable technologies are still 
immature, and not yet commercially delineated [62]. Investors prefer to invest in proven 
Rethinking the governance of energy poverty 
 
 
 16 
 
 
processes, which utilise familiar technologies with a competitive and predicable cost structure 
[21] – this technology realignment, removes these certainties. 
Further, the current continuous improvement in renewable technology tariffs is also 
encouraging commitment delays surrounding new electricity infrastructure, from some of the 
region’s governments, as they anticipate further reductions in tariff pricing; and fostering 
unrealistic tariff expectation from specific SSA governments: apparently Nigerian officials 
expect the recent low tariff struck in Zambia (US6.02c/kWh), to be a pricing benchmark for 
their own electricity projects, regardless of the substantial difference in each country’s 
perceived risk profiles to investors (their relative attractiveness as an investment destination – 
Zambia verses Nigeria) and specific factors such as the availability of soft loans that would not 
be available to Nigeria, that supported such a low tariff20. 
As most SSA governments remain committed from a governance perspective, to a centrally 
controlled monopoly, as its electricity delivery regime [1, 2, 35, 40, 46] the impact of each of 
these three systemic factors need an appreciating in this context.  
5.1  Unaffordable electricity services  
The inability of SSA households to afford electricity services, is often offered as the principal 
reason for the existence of electricity poverty in the region [2, 40, 64, 65, 66]; and this is not 
just about paying for connectivity or delivering electricity to the front door of a household, but 
also includes the costs associated with being able to then use it: such as the cost of electrical 
appliances or safely ‘wiring’ the recipient’s home [67,68]. Although these are not governance 
issues in themselves, how to respond to their realities most definitely are; and how to 
successfully overcome these realities, we argue, should be a central governance priority. 
The network ‘hub & spoke’ system is somewhat suitable for electricity delivery in the 
region’s principal urban areas, however its commerciality becomes unrealistic when it is 
deployed into rural areas, where the majority of SSA’s population lives and electricity poverty 
is most extreme. Extending the grid, is both very expensive to do and then properly maintain: 
in Kenya for instance, according to Parshall, et al [69], it costs US$1,900 to connect the more 
remote households (and this is likely to have increased), with no account for the cost of ongoing 
maintenance of the network or the further burdens of making it usable by households [64] – 
this cost is beyond the resources of all but a few select households. Such grid extensions are 
therefore difficult to justify commercially, a prerequisite for private investment, despite the 
obvious ‘positive externality benefits’ [70] offered by such connectivity [4, 65]. For the grid to 
be extended, it needs to be based on a subsidy from an unrelated source: which is usually the 
government through a form of rural electrification agency or program [35].  
The unintended consequences of persisting with this delivery system, for potential 
investors: is that it removes any likelihood of their participation in the distribution aspect of 
the infrastructure regime, as they are even more disadvantaged than the government as owner 
of such assets, as they are unable to capture any of the externality value [4]; and as an 
                                                 
 
20 Comments received from several industry professionals, attending a recent conference in Johannesburg. 
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independent power producer (IPP) [1], it weakens the utility’s credit worthiness (who will be 
the ‘offtake’ customer), as ongoing subsidies from fiscally weak governments are uncertain – 
this is, unless an un-related to the customer (either the  utility or end using consumer) financing 
structure can be identified. 
The extent of this challenge is probably best illustrated by the experiences of SA’s ‘rapid 
electrification program’, during the transition period from apartheid.  
“Prior to 1990, less than a third of the population {of SA} had access to electricity. By 
the end of the decade that proportion had doubled” [71:3125]. 
By the mid-1990s, it had become evident to Eskom that further electrification through grid 
extension, was not a commercial proposition, and could only be carried out through deficit 
financing off its own balance sheet and through cross subsidisation from other industrial and 
wealthy municipality users. This, however, is not an option for other SSA countries, as they do 
not have such endowments – and some of Eskom’s current financial vulnerability problems, 
can be argued to have started with this balance sheet subsidisation. The SA government finally 
took over the responsibility for financing the program from the early 2000s, through a national 
electrification fund [71] – but still electricity access is not universal, almost 20 years on.  
Distributive renewable technology can sidestep the grid extension issues just highlighted, 
as such technologies no longer require the utility grid network, for delivery: as they can be 
operated on a smaller scale (reduced cost) and independently of the electricity grid. Despite 
this however, affordability is still an issue, as such technology options still require a large 
financial outlay relative to rural household incomes. More importantly, as such technologies 
are still making significant advances in both cost and efficiency – it is sensible for 
investors/developers of larger capacity infrastructure, to delay investing in this technology, 
until it has matured and become stable, from an electricity unit (kWh) cost basis.  
5.2 Operational inadequacies  
To effectively operate this type of electricity delivery regime requires a utility to have a 
minimal level of both technological skill and tacit knowledge (capabilities) within its 
management structure [73], as well as a need for enough working capital. Without adequate 
levels of capability, the likelihood that a utility will recover its cost of delivering electricity 
when it sells it, becomes too uncertain due to both technical and non-technical losses. Technical 
losses entail a significant loss of electricity in the transmission, through a lack of maintenance 
of the transmission system – as high as 25% in Tanzania for example [46]; or an inability to 
operate effectively a demand and supply load management, within the network [35]. Non-
technical losses entail a significant risk that customers won’t pay for the electricity they use 
[2]: either by not paying their bills, or stealing electricity directly from the grid, or bypassing 
their electricity meter [71]. 
This looming spectre of technical and non-technical losses is then compounded by the issue 
of uncommercial tariffs (discussed in sect. 3.7). A combination of these factors will then push 
the utility towards insolvency, which is only averted by ongoing government subsidies - which 
are never enough. This stressed condition then results in further poor maintenance of the 
network, and little carriage of spare parts, which results in the network wearing out [16]. Such 
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a monopoly utility cannot be regarded as both a credit worthy and proficient partner for a 
private investor. 
Transmission and generation electricity infrastructure are co-dependent and reliable on 
each other for their commerciality, as value cannot be appropriated from one part of the 
infrastructure chain, without the other parts. The Lake Turkana wind farm in Kenya, was 
completed in mid-2017, but the connecting transmission lines connectivity has been delayed 
into the second half of 2018, as the utility KETRACO has been unable to keep to its 
construction schedule21. This reliability on third parties for connectivity is necessary as it is 
difficult to capture any value to compensate for the construction costs of missing parts of the 
infrastructure jigsaw by the original party, if connectivity is what is required, to allow an 
investment to function and appropriate value.  
5.3 Utility insolvency and subsidy dependence  
When utilities only stay solvent through government subsidies from general revenues (and 
indirectly, aid), this puts financial pressure on each governments balance sheet: particularly as 
the incremental cost of the new supply, has been much higher than the original existing supply 
[2], markedly when mobile diesel generators are used. An aggressive pursuit of such a strategy, 
has a danger of forcing a financially stretched national government into financial default [71], 
which introduces a whole new set of risks. This clearly dampens a government’s willingness 
to underwrite a private investor’s commercial risk. It is too early to judge how renewable 
technology will alleviate this issue. They also must justify their financial support of a 
commercial enterprise over alternative political priorities that are more electorally visible.  
5.4 Technological patrimonialism  
Lastly, when a government is ‘closed minded’ to the electricity delivery regime’s efficiency: 
either due to hostility for a new technology application, such as the application of distributive 
renewable technology over existing fossil fuel technology, as it potentially weakens its control 
over that delivery regime; or the current electricity regime is used to reward the political 
incumbent’s supporters and is integral to their neo-patrimonialism political structure – it 
prevents investment, as it creates an unreliable investment partner. 
 Discussion 
If SSA governments genuinely believe that the most suitable policy for increasing access 
to electricity for their populations, involves attracting private investment – then they must also 
be prepared to amend their current governance structures, to nullify those unintended 
consequences that make such investment unattractive. Further, these governments must also 
recognise that unlike natural resource extraction industries, a correctly regulated electricity 
infrastructure is a ‘normal’ margin business, that can quickly become uncommercial, and 
therefore un-attractive as a private investment proposition, if costs increase or revenues decline. 
                                                 
 
21 Aldwych International – the developer 
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Similarly, the development community must also appreciate that the challenge of delivering 
electricity access within SSA, is essentially an issue of finance: which makes this an enabling 
variable and a ‘gate-keeper’ to the resolution of accessibility – electricity connectivity requires 
a supporting infrastructure for its delivery, which will only exist if it can be paid for (and this 
includes smaller scale solutions). However, the ability to attract private finance is a dependent 
variable that relies on its own enabling variables, which include those that surround the process 
of governance. If the dominant development policy narrative for delivering electricity access 
to the region is to be successfully constructed around private investment, as the multilateral 
development community advocates, their approach to governance design also needs to be 
reprioritised, to include the reduction of investment risk 
Ultimately, each of the three governance perspectives – investment, political economy, and 
systems – has a different foci, and as such each misses aspects that the other perspectives offer.  
However, a synthesis of all three yields a holistic governance framework, which points the way 
towards what a more supportive environment for electricity investment might look like.  
Drawing from Dixit & Pindyck, [22:3] (sec 2.2) – an illiquid investment displays three 
important characteristics. Firstly, the investment will be irreversible, once an investment has 
commenced: it can’t simply be unwound without a significant loss of value. In our context, 
construction must be completed, and the commissioning of the asset delivered as envisaged 
during the planning of the infrastructure, before any value can be realised. Secondly, there will 
be uncertainty over future value of the investment: a lot of unanticipated things can happen to 
an electricity infrastructure development project in SSA that could negatively impact on that 
project’s deliverables before an assets operation commences. Thirdly, an investor controls their 
decision where and when to physically commit their financing and proceed with an investment 
[22].  
Using these three dynamics, it is possible to create three effective ‘good governance’ filters 
to determine how to evaluate a supportive governance structure for investment: 
(i) Will a country’s investment structure allow the reimbursement of the value of the 
initial investment (the initial cost), in the future? 
(ii)  Will a country’s political structure undermine the appropriation of the anticipated 
returns of an investment (the rewards); or meaningfully delay them?  
(iii) Will a country’s electricity delivery regime put an investment at a disadvantage, 
when compared to alternative comparable technological investment opportunities in 
alternative countries? (As every investment decision to proceed for a private investor, 
is a relative decision). 
These filters affirm the salience of Financial Investment Governance: the private sector 
investor perspective, which embodies the ability to efficiently create and repatriate investment 
value.  They affirm the salience of Political Governance: the political economy perspective, 
concerning the application of one-sided asymmetric power, and how this can permit the 
misappropriation of uncertain and excessive value. They affirm the salience of Technology 
Governance: the electricity delivery regime perspective, where the system’s inability to 
efficiently innovate and diffuse electricity technology, prevents a necessary appropriation of 
value that is necessary to make the application of the technology attractive.   
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When applied to SSA investment in new electricity infrastructure development, our 
synthesized approach to governance suggest 15 structural factors (some of which are unique to 
the region) that require appreciation by ‘policy actors’. These are factors which negatively 
impact the ability of the investor to generate and repatriate revenue (which represents both the 
initial value and the rewards of the investment). Identified structural factors that can be 
synthesized from across our three unique governance dimensions include:  
1. Insufficient local banking capabilities: In most SSA countries, the domestic banking 
systems are unable to finance any significant value of electricity infrastructure projects, 
even at a household level. 
2. Exchange rate convertibility: the inability to repatriate the principal investment and the 
investment’s returns, into the foreign investor’s original currency - usually attributable to 
either exchange controls or insufficient African currency liquidity. 
3. Uncommercial tariff regulation: electricity tariffs are not permitted to be commercially 
reflective for the cost of the investment 
4. Inadequate Law and Order structures: In many SSA countries, the institutions of legal 
enforcement do not prevent theft of various forms of value from an investment, as there is 
no effective recourse, or they represent the actual perpetrators; 
5. Uncertain security of the physical asset: the probability that the value of the investment 
will be diminished or destroyed by an independent third-party’s action, such as theft, 
vandalism, or terrorism; 
6. Uncertain revenue security of the asset: the probability that an unrelated third party will 
unexpectedly misappropriate the anticipated revenues (or a percentage of) from the 
investment; 
7. Unearned equity dilution: the requirement to allocate significant percentage of ownership 
(equity) of an investment, in return for nothing other than a permission to proceed. 
8. Rent-seeking: the attempt to appropriate excess value or ‘rent’ from an investment that 
doesn’t exist, by non-related beneficiaries of the investment; 
9. Corruption by officials: the abuse of a power asymmetry, in return for non-obligatory 
financial gain; 
10. Patrimonialism: the transference of value to an unrelated party (an insider) to support a 
political patronage system.  
11. Reallocation of the ownership of a project: a project’s ownership can be unexpectedly 
lost and reallocated to an unrelated party, usually between the planning and construction 
phases. This means an instant loss on all preparation costs up to that point by an investor 
(which are already excessively high)[41]; 
12. Path dependency and regime resistance: the government or the monopolist utility 
regimes are locked into a technology regime, which makes them hostile to change. For 
example, the ongoing preference to use coal as an electricity generating technology (often 
due to personal conflicting priorities). 
13. Insufficient working capital: there is insufficient working capital available within the 
utility, to support, operate and maintain the technological system at efficient levels 
14. Deficient technological tacit knowledge and skills: the successful diffusion of different 
electricity technologies are impeded, due to a shortfall in both household [68] and 
institutional technological capabilities [72,73]. 
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15. A lack of complementary assets: the supplementary assets or capabilities that are 
required to allow the primary asset to operate optimally, are not available [74] such as an 
efficient working electricity grid. 
All 15 factors are significant or at least meaningful, and they offer ‘policy actors’ and 
researchers a novel checklist when attempting to determine the particular risks facing any 
given SSA country’s infrastructure development.  
7. Conclusion  
We recognise that we must resist the dangers of overly homogenizing each of the three 
governance perspectives. Although some of the themes or factors may exist in most SSA 
countries, national context, resources, business patterns, industry strategies, levels of 
affordability and types of electricity infrastructure (to name a few) will still yield different 
shapes, and unfold differently across each country (and indeed, even sub-nationally). 
Thus, it is critical to treat SSA countries as heterogeneous, and to craft specific policies 
attuned to this complexity, accordingly.  That said, there is still value to the meta-theoretical 
governance principles underlying the three perspectives.  There is a ‘top down’ challenge: why 
internationally sourced private investment is deterred from investing in SSA electricity 
infrastructure, as well as a ‘bottom up’ one for why individual governments might or might not 
constrain such investment. It is also reasonable to apply homogeneity to the international 
investment community’s approach to this challenge, as they have a commonality of purpose in 
the way they approach investment (sec 2.2): they are all seeking an investment return from an 
initial commitment of investment value. 
The implication that arises is a mix of bottom up heterogeneous factors need balanced with 
the commonality of barriers (and perceptions from private sector finance) to create more 
attuned policy that arbitrates or mediates local factors with transnational expectations. To 
minimise these un-intended consequences, SSA governments need to re-design their 
governance structures to deliver: a minimisation of negative uncertainty to the value of the 
immediate cost of an electricity infrastructure investment; and a maximisation of certainty 
towards the future returns of that investment. This will require a government to deliver both 
cost and policy certainty to investors – as excessive change in either of these, increase costs, 
which then stops private investment. Finally, governments should discard (or at least adapt), 
the ‘network, hub and spoke’ model, and relinquish their utility’s monopoly control: as 
electricity service delivery needs to be decentralised, to permit flexibility in the adoption of 
new technologies and electricity delivery solutions, to facilitate electricity access in poorer 
rural areas: where all possible costs need to be stripped out of the process, and maximum 
flexibility is essential.  
The ambition of this paper has been to realign our understanding of the impact of 
governance, when it is applied to the private financing of electricity infrastructure development 
in SSA. Perhaps when this occurs in practice, if ‘policy actors,’ financial institutions, and 
development practitioners calibrate their investment, political, and technological systems of 
governance accordingly, SSA can transform itself from a perpetual laggard to a promising 
leader for electric utility investment and reform.  
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